The specific concern was that in the absence of a formal arms control process, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) could expire in 2026, and with it the remaining legally binding limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. The State Department offices tasked with non-proliferation and arms control have been historically understaffed, with key jobs being filled only gradually. If we expect to ever return to arms control, it will need to be global, not simply bilateral, in scope and getting China involved in stability talks can open the way. Although Russia’s violations of international law have forced us to consider how to proceed while the formal arms control process is on hold, it would be an error to proceed if the absence of such a process automatically means the end of arms control or, through its suspension, greater danger of nuclear weapons use. National and global interests dictate that it is worth pursuing such non-proliferation and arms control efforts as they will help lower tensions and possibly set the stage for eventual reductions in nuclear weapons.

Source: Washington Post June 01, 2022 15:04 UTC